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THE COST TO CARRY: NEW YORK STATE’S REGULATION 
ON FIREARM REGISTRATION 





(decided July 9, 2013) 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in Kwong v. Bloom-
berg, held that New York City’s residential handgun licensing fee, 
Administrative Code § 10-131(a)(2),2 does not impose an unconstitu-
tional burden on the plaintiffs’ Second Amendment rights because 
the fees were regulated to defray the costs of administering the stat-
ute.3  The court also highlighted that the revenues raised by the fees 
did not exceed these costs.4  In addition, the court held that New York 
State Penal Law § 400.00(14),5 authorizing the New York City li-
censing fee, did not violate the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment.6  In this case, the plaintiffs consisted of individu-
als who had been issued residential handgun licenses
7
 in New York 
City and two organizations, the Second Amendment Foundation and 
the New York State Rifle and Pistol Association.
8
  This action was 
 
1 723 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2013). 
2 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CODE § 10-131(a)(2) (2012). 
3 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 168-69. 
4 Id. at 166. 
5 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(14) (McKinney 2013). 
6 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 172. 
7 A license holder is allowed to “have and posses [a handgun] in his dwelling.”  N.Y. 
PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(a).  These types of licenses are generally referred to as “premises-
residence” handgun licenses.  See generally Rombom v. Kelly, 901 N.Y.S.2d 29, 30 (App. 
Div. 1st Dep’t 2010). 
8 Kwong v. Bloomberg, 876 F. Supp. 2d 246, 247 (S.D.N.Y. 2012).  During the trial court 
proceedings, the New York Attorney General argued that the plaintiffs lacked standing to 
bring this action.  Id. at 251.  The court held that the individuals, who brought suit, had paid 
the $340, and obtained a residential handgun license, had standing to bring the actions.  Id. at 
1
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brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, asserting that:  
(1) New York City Administration Code § 10-
1313(a)(2) violates the Second Amendment by requir-
ing New York City residents to pay $340
9
 to obtain a 
residential handgun license
10
; and (2) New York Penal 
Law § 400.00(14) violates the Equal Protection Clause 
of the Fourteenth Amendment by allowing New York 
City and Nassau County to charge a higher handgun 





The Second Amendment provides: “A well regulated Militia, 
being necessary to the security of a free State, the right of the people 
to keep and bear Arms, shall not be infringed.”12  “[T]his right is 
deeply rooted in [our] Nation’s history and tradition” with its origins 
based on the English Bill of Rights of 1689.13  In the 1760s and 
1770s, American colonists asserted the right to bear arms in response 
to King George III’s attempt to disarm them.14  During the Bill of 
Rights ratification debates in 1788, the paranoia that a central “gov-
ernment would disarm the population in order to impose rule through 
a standing army or select militia was pervasive in Antifederalist rhet-
 
253.  In this appellate action, the Second Circuit chose not to review whether the organiza-
tions had standing because they agreed with the trial court that the individual plaintiffs had 
standing.  Kwong, 723 F.3d at 162 n.4.  See, e.g., Disability Advocates, Inc. v. New York 
Coal. for Quality Assisted Living, Inc., 675 F.3d 149, 156-57 (2d Cir. 2012) (discussing 
standing between individuals and associate organizations); Vill. of Arlington Heights v. Met-
ro. Hous. Dev. Corp., 429 U.S. 252, 263-64 (1977) (declining to address the issue as to 
whether an organization had standing after concluding that at least one individual plaintiff 
retained standing). 
9 Not only was the $340 licensing fee contested at the trial court level, but the plaintiffs’ 
highlighted that they were required to pay an additional $94.25 fee for “fingerprinting and 
background checks conducted by the New York State Division of Criminal Justice Service.”  
Kwong, 723 F.3d at 162 n.5.  It was noted that this fee is paid only for initial application and 
not for renewals; thus it was not contested on appeal.  Id. 
10 It should be noted that although the License Division of New York State issues licenses 
for many different types of firearms, the plaintiffs’ appeal is concerned solely with the fee 
associated with obtaining a residential handgun license.  Id. at 162 n.6. 
11 Id. at 162. 
12 U.S. CONST. amend II. 
13 McDonald v. City of Chicago, 130 S. Ct. 3020, 3036 (2010). 
14 Id. at 3037. 
2
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oric.”15  Federalists agreed with Antifederalists, not that the right was 
“important to warrant protection” from tyranny, “but by contending 
that the right was adequately protected by the Constitution’s assign-
ment of only limited powers to the Federal Government.”16 
This fear of tyranny, which prompted the addition of the Se-
cond Amendment to the constitution, lasted until the 1850s.17  
Around this time, self-defense became the focal point for the en-
forcement of the right to bear arms.18  This need for self-defense be-
came a priority in the southern states during the post-Civil War era.19  
In these southern states, former confederate troops would forcibly 
remove weapons from recently freed slaves.20  Although Union Army 
commanders took action to prevent these armed parties from denying 
citizens their right to keep and bear arms, the 39th Congress deter-
mined that legislation to enforce the amendment was required.21  The 
Freedmen’s Bureau Act of 1866 provided: 
[T]he right . . . to have full and equal benefit of all 
laws and proceedings concerning personal liberty, per-
sonal security, and the acquisition, enjoyment, and 
disposition of estate, real and personal, including the 
constitutional right to bear arms, shall be secured to 
and enjoyed by all citizens . . . without respect to race 
or color, or previous condition of slavery.22 
 In 2008, in District of Columbia v. Heller,23 the Supreme 
Court reiterated this fundamental right for all citizens to possess a 
handgun in one’s home for the purpose of self-defense.  In Heller, the 
Supreme Court determined that “the Second Amendment conferred 
an individual right to keep and bear arms.”24  In Heller, the respond-
ent applied for a firearm license in order to keep a firearm in his 




17 Id. at 3038. 
18 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3038. 
19 Id. at 3039. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. at 3039-40. 
22 Id. at 3040. 
23 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
24 Id. at 595. 
25 Id. at 575. 
3
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ficer, the application was subsequently denied by the District of Co-
lumbia.26  At the time of this denial, the District of Columbia penal-
ized the carrying of unregistered firearms, yet the law prohibited the 
registration of handguns.27  The respondent challenged the denial of 
his handgun registration as an unconstitutional burden on his Second 
Amendment rights.28  The Supreme Court held, “on the basis of both 
text and history, that the Second Amendment conferred an individual 
right to keep and bear arms.”29  However, the Court only answered 
the issue of whether the federal government was subject to the Se-
cond Amendment’s freedoms; it did not provide guidance to the Se-
cond Amendment’s applicability to the states. 
Two years later, the Supreme Court addressed the state ap-
plicability issue in McDonald v. City of Chicago.30  In McDonald, 
Chicago residents challenged the constitutionality of a city statute 
that prohibited an individual from possessing a handgun without val-
id registration.31  Further, the city had also made it unlawful to regis-
ter handguns, similar to the statute in Heller.32  The respondents in 
McDonald contended that enforcement of the Chicago statute was a 
violation of their Second Amendment rights.33  Although counsel for 
the City of Chicago argued that the ban “protect[ed] its residents 
from the loss of property and injury or death from firearms,” the Chi-
cago residents included police statistics that the city’s handgun mur-
der rate had increased since the enactment of the firearm ban.34  The 
Supreme Court determined that although the Fourteenth Amendment 
traditionally protected individuals against state discrimination, it fur-
ther “protect[ed] constitutionally enumerated rights, including the 
right to keep and bear arms.”35  Thus, McDonald held that Second 
Amendment rights were fully applicable to the states.36 
In the State of New York, an individual may possess a firearm 
under certain circumstances; however, it is illegal to possess a hand-
 
26 Id. 
27 Id. at 574-75. 
28 Heller, 554 U.S. at 575-76. 
29 Id. at 595. 
30 130 S. Ct. 3020 (2010). 
31 Id. at 3027. 
32 Id. at 3026. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 McDonald, 130 S. Ct. at 3025. 
36 Id. at 3050. 
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gun without a valid license.37  Absent the fulfillment of these exemp-
tions, New York State generally prohibits the carrying and possession 
of firearms without a license.38  The State defines a firearm “to in-
clude pistols, revolvers, shotguns with barrels less than eighteen 
inches in length, rifles with barrels less than sixteen inches in length, 
and any weapon made from a shotgun or rifle with an overall length 
of less than twenty-six inches.”39  New York Penal Law § 400.00 “is 
the exclusive statutory mechanism for the licensing of firearms in 
New York State.”40 
Under New York Penal Law § 400.00(14), the general range 
of the state licensing is set from $3 to $10; however, the statute does 
allow an exception for both New York City and Nassau County to es-
tablish licensing fees that fall outside this range.41  Pursuant to this 
exception, New York City Administrative Code § 10-131(a)(2) pro-
vides that every applicant for a license to “carry or possess a pistol or 
revolver in the city” shall pay a fee of $340 for each original or re-
newal application every three years.42 
The New York State Legislature makes it illegal to possess a 
handgun within the home without a license.43  New York Penal Law 
§ 400 provides for several different types of licenses to carry or pos-
sess handguns in various places or circumstances, including the li-
cense at issue here, the premises-residence handgun license.44  The 
premises-residence handgun license permits a licensee to “have and 
possess [a handgun] in his dwelling.”45  In order to obtain or renew a 
premises-residence handgun license, an individual must be twenty-
one years of age or older.46 
Further, New York Law restricts handgun licensing or renew-
al “except by the licensing officer, and then only after investigation 
and finding that all statements in a proper application for a license are 
 
37 See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.01(1) (McKinney 2013) (making possession of any firearm 
a class A misdemeanor); see also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 265.20(a)(3) (providing an exception 
for persons to whom a license has been issued). 
38 Kachalsky v. Cnty. of Westchester, 701 F.3d 81, 85 (2d Cir. 2012). 
39 Id. 
40 O’Conner v. Scarpino, 638 N.E.2d 950 (N.Y. 1994). 
41 Kwong, 723 U.S. at 162. 
42 NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., CODE § 10-131(a)(2) (2012). 
43 N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 265.01(1), 265.20(a)(3). 
44 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2). 
45 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(2)(a). 
46 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1). 
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true.”47  The licensing officer may not approve the application if 
“good cause exists” to deny the license.48  Licensing officers are 
“vested with considerable discretion” in determining whether to ap-
prove or deny a submitted firearm license application.49  If denied, 
Article 78 of New York’s Civil Practice law and Rules allows a fire-
arm license applicant to request for judicial review of said denial.50  
However, in order to overturn the denial of a firearm license applica-
tion, the licensing officer’s determination must be found to be “arbi-
trary and capricious.”51 
In 2012, in Kachalsky v. County of Westchester,52 the Second 
Circuit addressed whether the State requirement that an applicant 
demonstrate “proper cause” to obtain a concealed handgun license 
violates an individual’s Second Amendment.53  The Second Circuit 
held that New York State law preventing an individual from obtain-
ing a full-carry, concealed handgun license to possess handguns in 
public, does not violate the Second Amendment.54  The court in 
Kachalsky further held that proper cause or a demonstrated personal 
need for self-protection, which is distinguishable from that of the 
general community, is required to obtain a license; thus, any denial of 
a concealed carry handgun license without this showing did not vio-
late the Second Amendment.55  The court stated, “Unlike a license for 
target shooting or hunting, [a] generalized desire to carry a concealed 
weapon to protect one’s person and property does not constitute 
‘proper cause.’ ”56  The court in Kachalsky highlighted that the par-
ties did not dispute that “New York has substantial, indeed compel-
ling, governmental interests in public safety and crime prevention.”57 
The court in Kachalsky concluded that “ ‘[p]roper respect for 
a coordinate branch of government’ requires that [the court] strike 
 
47 Id.; see Kwong, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 249 (highlighting other duties assigned to licensing 
officers, including determining whether the eligibility requirements set forth under New 
York law are met, inspecting medical hygiene record, and investigating the truthfulness of 
statements made in the application). 
48 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(1)(g). 
49 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 87. 
50 Id. 
51 Id. 
52 701 F.3d 81 (2d Cir. 2012). 
53 Id. at 83. 
54 Id. at 101. 
55 Id. at 99-100. 
56 Id. at 86. 
57 Kachalsky, 701 F.3d at 97. 
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down legislation only if ‘the lack of constitutional authority to pass 
the act in question is clearly demonstrated.’ ”58  However, the court 
determined that the plaintiffs failed to meet their evidentiary burden 
to show that a special need for self-protection should not be a requi-
site for acquiring a firearm license.
59
  The court stated that the plain-
tiffs did not “clearly demonstrate that limiting handgun possession in 
public to those who show a special need for self-protection is incon-
sistent with the Second Amendment”; thus, the plaintiffs’ claim was 
denied.60 
Similar to the plaintiffs in Kachalsky, the plaintiffs in Kwong 
challenged two specific statutory provisions related to this licensing 
scheme.61  First, they contended that Administrative Code § 10-
131(a)(2) violated the Second Amendment because the fee it imposed 
was excessive and it impermissibly burdened their Second Amend-
ment right to keep and bear arms.62  The plaintiffs also challenged the 
New York State statute allowing the City of New York to set the li-
censing fee outside of the general $3 to $10 range.63  The plaintiffs 
argued that the New York City exception violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause because it drew a classification between New York City 
residents and other citizens of New York State, resulting in a dispar-
ate burden on the exercise of New York City residents’ Second 
Amendment rights.64 
New York Penal Law § 400.00(14) provides the New York 
City Council and the Nassau County Board of Supervisors with the 
option to fix the fee to be charged for a license to carry a pistol or re-
volver outside of the general $3 to $10 range.65  The statute provides: 
In [New York City], the city council and in the county 
of Nassau the Board of Supervisors shall fix the fee to 
be charged for a license to carry or possess a pistol or 
revolver and provide for the disposition of such fees.  
Elsewhere in the state, the licensing officer shall col-
lect and pay into the county treasury the following 
 
58 Id. at 100-01 (quoting United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629, 635 (1883)). 
59 Id. at 101. 
60 Id. 
61 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 162. 
62 Id. at 165. 
63 Id. at 161. 
64 Id. at 169. 
65 N.Y. PENAL LAW § 400.00(14). 
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fees: for each license to carry or possess a pistol or re-
volver, no less than three dollars nor more than ten 
dollars as may be determined by the legislative body 
of the county.66 
The ability to set the fee outside of the general range has been author-
ized in New York City since 1947.67  Between 1962 and 2004, the li-
censing fee in New York City was increased six separate times, the 
most recent being an amendment to Administrative Code § 10-
131(a)(2) from a two-year permit set at $170 to a three-year permit 
currently set at $340.68  The amendment to New York Administrative 
Code § 10-131(a)(2) also allowed New York City to recover some of 
the costs of processing license applications.69 
Accompanying the amendment, the New York City Office of 
Management and Budget prepared a “User Cost Analysis” report 
showing an average administrative cost of $343.49 per application for 
a handgun license processed by the Licensing Department.70  Moreo-
ver, the New York City Council’s Committee on Finance offered a 
supplemental account showing the expenses incurred and revenues 
collected by the City’s handgun licensing system.71  This report de-
tailed that costs associated with the licensing scheme amounted to 
over $6 million; however, the fees collected merely totaled $3.35 mil-
lion, equaling a loss of over $2.6 million.72  Yet, the report concluded 
with an estimate that the increase of the licensing fee to $340 would 
result in an estimated increase of $1.1 million in revenue.73 
III. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S ANALYSIS OF THE $340 FEE 
In resolving whether the $340 handgun licensing fee imposed 
by Administrative Code § 10-131(a)(2) violated the Second Amend-
ment, the Second Circuit first decided whether the fee was permissi-
 
66 Id. 
67 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 163. 
68 Id.; see also NEW YORK CITY, N.Y., LOCAL LAW 37 (2004) (amending NY Administra-
tive Code 10-131(a)(2), allowing the change from two years till renewal to three; on average 
increasing the cost of the license by $28.33 per year). 
69 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 163. 
70 Id. 
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ble under the Supreme Court’s fee jurisprudence doctrine, namely 
used in First Amendment analyses.74  Judge Cabranes’s opinion 
states, “[T]he Supreme Court’s First Amendment fee jurisprudence 
provides the appropriate foundation for addressing plaintiffs’ fee 
claims under the Second Amendment.”75  The fee jurisprudence doc-
trine has historically been used during analysis of constitutional chal-
lenges to governmental fees on “expressive activities protected under 
the First Amendment[,]” for example, fees charged for holding a pro-
test, parade, or rally.76 
A. The Supreme Court’s Fee Jurisprudence Doctrine 
In the First Amendment context, the Supreme Court has held 
that governmental entities may impose licensing fees relating to the 
exercise of constitutional rights when the fees are designed “to meet 
the expense incident to the administration of the [licensing statute] 
and to the maintenance of public order in the matter licensed.”77  In 
other words, fees that serve as a method to defray the costs particular-
ly incurred in the enforcement of municipal or state regulations, and 
not solely as revenue taxes, are constitutionally permissible.78 
In Cox v. New Hampshire,79 sixty-eight Jehovah’s Witnesses 
were convicted in a New Hampshire municipal court for violating a 
regulation that disallowed public demonstrations conducted without 
being issued a special license or permit.80  The Supreme Court found 
 
74 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 165. 
75 Id. 
76 Id.; see Heller, 554 U.S. at 595 (noting similarities between the analyses of the First 
Amendment and the Second Amendment); see also Justice v. Town of Cicero, 827 F. Supp. 
2d 835 (N.D. Ill. 2011) (finding that a firearms-regulation requirement, though not automati-
cally valid, is not invalid simply because it regulates the exercise of an individual's Second 
Amendment constitutional right). 
77 Cox v. New Hampshire, 312 U.S. 569, 577 (1941); compare id. (allowing a parade li-
censing fee as constitutionally permissible because fees were set to defray administrative 
costs), with Murdock v. Pennsylvania, 319 U.S. 105, 113-14 (1943) (striking down a license 
tax that was “not a nominal fee [designed] as a regulatory measure to defray the expenses of 
policing the activities in question.”). 
78 See Seleven v. New York Thruway Auth., 711 F.3d 253, 259-61 (2d Cir. 2013) (holding 
a toll bridge fee as constitutionally permissible); see also Nat’l Awareness Found. v. 
Abrams, 50 F.3d 1159, 1165 (2d Cir. 1995) (stating that fees that serve as revenue taxes-not 
as means to meet costs of administration to the public order-are not constitutionally permis-
sible). 
79 312 U.S. 569 (1941). 
80 Id. at 570-571. 
9
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that the New Hampshire municipality retained sufficient police power 
to administer regulations in furtherance of the control of its streets 
and “cannot be denied authority to give consideration, without unfair 
discrimination, to [the] time, place, and manner in relation to the oth-
er proper uses of the streets.”81  The municipality’s license fee for 
processions was set at a permissible range up to $300.82  This fee, the 
Court noted, would differ depending on the size and manner required 
of the proposed parade or procession.83  The Supreme Court conclud-
ed that the proposed fee was “not a revenue tax, but . . . [a cost relat-
ed] to the administration of the act and to the maintenance of public 
order.”84 
The Circuit Courts have generally extended this First 
Amendment analysis to determine whether fees concerning Second 
Amendment licensing rights are constitutional.85  In United States v. 
Decastro,86 the defendant was convicted of transporting a Florida-
licensed firearm into New York without obtaining a proper New 
York license.87  The defendant contended that the federal firearm 
transportation statute substantially burdened his right to keep and 
bear arms.88  The Second Circuit stated, “In deciding whether a law 
substantially burdens Second Amendment rights, it is therefore ap-
propriate to consult principles from other areas of constitutional law, 
including the First Amendment.”89 
The court in Decastro subsequently found that the defendant 
lacked standing because he had never applied for a license in New 
York.90  Further, the Second Circuit held that although the challenged 
transportation statute prohibited the movement of a firearm between 
states without a sufficient license, the statute did “nothing to keep 
someone from purchasing a firearm in [his or] her home state, which 
is presumptively the most convenient place to buy anything.”91  
 
81 Id. at 576. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 576-77. 
84 Cox, 312 U.S. at 577. 
85 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 165. 
86 682 F.3d 160 (2d Cir. 2012). 
87 Id. at 161. 
88 Id. at 163. 
89 Id. at 167. 
90 Id. at 164 (“As a general matter, to establish standing to challenge an allegedly uncon-
stitutional policy, a plaintiff must submit to the challenged policy.”) (quoting Jackson-Bey v. 
Hanslmaier, 115 F.3d 1091, 1096 (2d Cir. 1997)). 
91 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 168. 
10
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In Kwong, the Second Circuit used the same approach in de-
termining whether Administrative Code § 10-131(a)(2) substantially 
burdened an individual’s right to bear arms.92  The court held that the 
New York Office of Management and Budget’s user cost analysis re-
port clearly showed that the $340 licensing fee was designed to assist 
in reducing the administrative expenses related with conducting the 
City’s firearm licensing system.93  Although the court noted that $340 
licensing fee is well over the $10 maximum set in other New York 
Counties, it highlighted that “this is simply not the test for assessing 
the validity of a licensing fee.”94  Even though the plaintiffs contend-
ed that the fees must be “nominal” to be permissible, pursuant to 
Murdock v. Pennsylvania,95 their argument was quickly rejected.96 
In Murdock, the Supreme Court invalidated a city ordinance 
that required religious groups to pay a license fee of $1.50 a day be-
fore distributing literature.97  The Court found the law to be “a flat tax 
imposed on the exercise of a privilege granted by the Bill of Rights” 
because the license fee was not a “nominal fee imposed as a regulato-
ry measure to defray the expense of policing the activities in ques-
tion.”98  The plaintiffs argued that this statement meant that the fee 
was not permissible unless it was both nominal and designed to de-
fray administrative expenses.99  The District Court rejected this ar-
gument stating, “this argument was explicitly rejected by the Su-
preme Court in Forsyth County, Georgia v. Nationalist Movement,100 
where the Court concluded that the courts below had erred in inter-
preting Murdock in this manner.”101 
While conceiving the possibility of fees to become so “exor-
bitant” as to deter the exercise of the licensed activity, the court in 
Kwong found that the plaintiffs merely asserted that the fee is exces-
 
92 Kwong, 723 U.S. at 167. 
93 Id. at 166. 
94 Id. 
95 319 U.S. 105 (1943). 
96 Kwong, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 255; see Forsyth Cnty., Ga. v. Nationalist Movement, 505 
U.S. 123, 137 (1992) (“Th[e] sentence [in Murdock] does not mean . . . only nominal charges 
are constitutionally permissible.  It reflects merely one distinction between the facts in Mur-
dock and those in Cox.  The tax at issue in Murdock was invalid because it was unrelated to 
any legitimate state interest, not because it was of a particular size.”). 
97 Murdock, 319 U.S. at 106-07. 
98 Id. at 113-14. 
99 Kwong, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 255. 
100 505 U.S. 123 (1992). 
101 Kwong, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 255 (citation omitted). 
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sive.102  Further, the court found that the plaintiffs provided no evi-
dence to suggest that the $340 fee prohibited an individual from ob-
taining a residential handgun license.103  Moreover, the fact that the 
individual plaintiffs were able to obtain the licenses they were seek-
ing demonstrated that the “fee was not prohibitive or exclusionary as 
applied to these individual[s].”104  Because of this determination, the 
Second Circuit held that New York Administrative Code § 10-
131(a)(2) was constitutional as a permissible fee.105 
B. Constitutional Burden Analysis of the $340 Fee 
The court in Kwong next considered whether Administrative 
Code § 10-131(a)(2) imposed an unconstitutional burden on an indi-
vidual’s Second Amendment rights.106  In United States v. Decastro, 
the Second Circuit held that the appropriate level of scrutiny for re-
view of a statute dealing with the Second Amendment is determined 
by how “substantially” that statute burdens the exercise of  Second 
Amendment rights.107  The court explained that if the alleged burden 
imposed by a regulation of firearms was a “marginal, incremental or 
even appreciable restraint on the right to keep and bear arms,” it 
would not be analyzed under heightened scrutiny.108  The court con-
tinued, stating that “heightened scrutiny is appropriate only as to 
those regulations that substantially burden [] Second Amendment 
[rights],” not merely by placing a restraint on them.109 
The court in Kwong held that Administrative Code § 10-
131(a)(2) did not substantially burden an individual’s Second 
Amendment right solely because the licensing requirement made it 
more expensive.110  The court did not actually decide whether Ad-
ministration Code § 10-131(a)(2) warranted a heightened scrutiny re-
view.111  Instead, it held that the statute would endure an intermediate 
 
102 Id. at 256. 
103 Id. 
104 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 166-67. 
105 Id. at 167. 
106 Id. 
107 Decastro, 682 F.3d at 167-68. 
108 Id. at 166. 
109 Id. at 164. 
110 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 167. 
111 Id. at 168. 
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form of heightened scrutiny.112  Under an intermediate form of 
heightened scrutiny standard, a regulation that burdens Second 
Amendment rights “passes constitutional muster if it is substantially 
related to the achievement of an important governmental interest.”113 
Observing that New York has a compelling interest in public 
safety and crime prevention, the court held that “the licensing fee is 
designed to allow the City of New York to recover the costs incurred 
through operating its licensing scheme, which is designed to promote 
public safety and prevent gun violence.”114  For these reasons, the Se-
cond Circuit affirmed the order of the District Court concluding that 
the $340 licensing fee was constitutional.115 
IV. THE SECOND CIRCUIT’S EQUAL PROTECTION ANALYSIS OF 
PENAL LAW SECTION 400.00(14) 
The second issue addressed in Kwong was whether New York 
State Penal Law § 400.00(14), allowing New York City and Nassau 
County to alter the licensing fee to $340, violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause.116  Again, the analysis began with a determination of the 
level of scrutiny that should be used during analysis of the alleged 
constitutional violation.117  The plaintiffs asserted that because Penal 
Law § 400.000(14) imposed additional and unequal requirements on 
New York City residents, as opposed to other citizens who reside in 
the rest of the state, the statute violated the Equal Protection 
Clause.118  Further, the plaintiffs contended that the statute “should be 
reviewed under strict scrutiny, and should be found unconstitutional 
to the extent it authorizes [only] the City [and Nassau County] to im-
pose a fee greater than $10,” which according to the plaintiffs, places 
a burden on the exercise of a constitutional right.119 
The Equal Protection Clause prohibits the states from “de-
ny[ing] to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 




114 Id. at 168-69. 
115 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 169. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
118 Kwong, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 259. 
119 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 169. 
120 U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. 
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The guarantee of equal protection . . . is not a 
source of substantive rights or liberties, but rather a 
right to be free from invidious discrimination in statu-
tory classifications and other governmental activity.  It 
is well settled that where a statutory classification does 
not itself impinge on a right or liberty protected by the 
Constitution, the validity of classification must be sus-
tained unless “the classification rests on grounds 
wholly irrelevant to the achievement of [any legiti-
mate governmental] objective.”121 
The presumption of validity of classification will disappear, however, 
if the reason for classification is based on “suspect” elements, such as 
gender-based or race-based classifications.122  In Romer v. Evans,123 
the Supreme Court established that “if a law neither burdens a fun-
damental right nor targets a suspect class,” the statute would be up-
held “so long as it bears a rational relation to some legitimate end.”124  
Otherwise stated, the Court determined that, without classification of 
a suspect class, legislation would be upheld as long as the enactment 
in question was rationally related to a legitimate governmental agen-
da.125 
A. Penal Law Section 400.00(14) is Subject to Rational 
Basis Review 
In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc.,126 the Su-
preme Court noted that the Equal Protection Clause “is essentially a 
direction that all persons similarly situated should be treated alike,” 
not requiring “that all persons be dealt with identically, but it does 
require that a distinction made have some relevance to the purposes 
 
121 Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 322 (1980) (quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 
420, 425 (1961)). 
122 Id. 
123 517 U.S. 620 (1996). 
124 Id. at 631. 
125 See Heller v. Doe, 509 U.S. 312, 320 (1993) (holding that a classification will survive 
rational basis scrutiny “if there is a rational relationship between the disparity of treatment 
and some legitimate government purpose.”); see also Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 15 
(1992) (highlighting that a legislature that creates these categories need not “actually articu-
late at any time the purpose or rationale supporting its classification.”). 
126 473 U.S. 432 (1985). 
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for which the classification is made.”127  In other words, the Four-
teenth Amendment does not require equal treatment for all, but it 
does, however, require a reason relating to public state interest for 
why different classes would statutorily be treated differently.128 
Cleburne established that this general rule gives way when 
any classification is sorted by “race, alienage, or national origin.”129  
The court reasoned that “[t]hese factors are so seldom relevant to the 
achievement of any legitimate state interest that laws grounded in 
such consideration are deemed to reflect prejudice and antipathy-a 
view that those in the burdened class are not as worthy or deserving 
as others.”130  Any alleged discrimination of these suspect statutory 
classifications will be subjected to strict scrutiny and will be allowed 
only if they are “suitably tailored to serve a compelling state inter-
est.”131 
The court in Kwong, however, agreed with the plaintiffs that 
Penal Law § 400.00(14) differentiated between New York City resi-
dents and other New York State citizens by instituting a $10 maxi-
mum fee “applicable only to the latter group; this indicate[d] only 
that the law draws a classification, not that this classification burdens 
a constitutional right.”132  The court reasoned that Penal 
Law § 400.00(14) neither burdened a fundamental right nor targeted 
a suspect class.133  The court subsequently determined that rational 
basis was the appropriate standard of review.134 
The Second Circuit has reasoned that Penal Law § 400.00(14) 
“simply allows” New York City and Nassau County to set the fee 
above the $3 to $10 range, albeit the statute does require that a licens-
ing fee for firearm possession be set in all other parts of New York 
State.135  The court in Kwong emphasized three examples of what Pe-
nal Law § 400.00(14) does “not do.”136  The statute does not mandate 
the City Council to implement a firearm license fee greater than other 
license fees set in other counties of the state, it merely allows the 
 
127 Id. at 439; see also Kwong, 723 F.3d at 169. 
128 Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 439-40. 
129 Id. at 440. 
130 Id. 
131 Id. 
132 Kwong, 876 F. Supp. 2d at 260. 
133 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 170. 
134 Id. 
135 Id. at 169. 
136 Id. at 169-70. 
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ability to do so.137  Secondly, it does not restrict all the other parts of 
New York State to apply for a legislative exemption to Penal 
Law § 400.00(14), like New York City and Nassau County have 
done.138  Lastly, the Second Circuit found that the Penal Law does not 
allow a government to charge any fee amount, only an amount rea-
sonably necessary to cover the costs of the “issuance, inspection, and 
enforcement.”139  The court concluded that, beyond setting the licens-
ing fee range from $3 to $10 to most of New York State, “Penal Law 
§ 400.00(14) itself does nothing to burden anyone’s Second Amend-
ment rights.”140 
B. Penal Law Section 400.00(14)’s Survival of 
“Rational Basis” Review 
Rational basis review requires “only that there be a rational 
relationship between the disparity of treatment and some legitimate 
governmental purpose” for the statute to survive analysis.141  The de-
termination given by Kwong included many of the same reasons that 
allowed Administrative Code § 10-131(a)(2) to survive constitutional 
scrutiny, namely the fact that the fee set by the New York City Coun-
cil was to defray the administrative costs attendant to the firearm li-
censing scheme.142 
The plaintiffs in Kwong stipulated that “the state had a legiti-
mate interest in allowing New York City to recoup the costs incurred 
by its regulatory schemes.”143  Further, the court in Kwong reasoned 
that the flexibility afforded to New York City and Nassau County, to 
reduce expenses in its licensing scheme, would help guarantee that 
the scheme remained satisfactorily funded, “thereby allowing it to 
function properly.”144  Lastly, the Second Circuit noted that every 
 
137 Id. 
138 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 170. 
139 Id.; see ATM One L.L.C. v. Inc. Vill. Of Freeport, 714 N.Y.S.2d 721 (App. Div. 2d 
Dep’t 2000) (settling that where a license or permit fee is imposed under the power to regu-
late “the amount charged cannot be greater than a sum reasonably necessary to cover the 
costs of issuance, inspection and enforcement . . . [t]o the extent that fees charged are exact-
ed for revenue purposes or to offset the cost of general governmental functions they are inva-
lid as an unauthorized tax.”). 
140 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 170. 
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firearm application would trigger a background check, a check into 
an “applicant’s mental health, criminal history and moral character, 
thus helping to ensure” that the system “promotes public safety.”145  
For these reasons, Kwong held that the state statute allowing certain 
municipalities an exemption to its required $3 to $10 range estab-
lished a rational relationship to a legitimate governmental purpose.146 
Therefore, after determining that Penal Code § 400.00(14) 
survived rational basis review and highlighting the legitimate gov-
ernment purposes for allowing the exemptions that the Penal Law 
provides, the Second Circuit concluded that Penal Law § 400.00(14) 
“survive[d] rational basis review and [in turn, did] not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause.”147 
V. CONCLUSION 
In Judge Walker’s concurring opinion, he stated, “[t]he full 
import of the Second Amendment right and the government’s burden 
to justify the infringement of this right in different contexts remain 
opaque.”148  Departing from the majority and adding to this confu-
sion, Judge Walker considered this licensing fee to be a substantial 
burden on one’s right to possess a firearm in her home for self de-
fense, a fundamental tenant of the Second Amendment.149  Thus, a 
substantial burden would call for intermediate scrutiny, which Judge 
Walker then believed the statute would have survived.150 
Judge Walker’s concurring opinion disagreed with the majori-
ty’s observation that the court “need not address the questions of 
whether the fee is a substantial burden and what level of scrutiny is 
required.”151  The concurring opinion determined that intermediate 
scrutiny is sufficient because Administrative Code § 10-131(a)(2) 
imposed a burden, not a ban, on an individual’s Second Amendment 
fundamental right.152  Even though Judge Walker utilized a different 
level of review than the majority, they arrived at the same conclu-
sion—Administrative Code § 10-131(a)(2) survived intermediate 
 
145 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 170. 
146 Id. at 172. 
147 Id. (Walker, J., concurring). 
148 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 172 (Walker, J., concurring). 
149 Id. 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 173. 
152 Id. at 174. 
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scrutiny because of its substantial relationship to a legitimate gov-
ernment interest, namely public safety from the threats of firearms.153 
As per the Fee Jurisprudence doctrine, precedence has al-
lowed the courts to use First Amendment doctrine in analyzing Se-
cond Amendment issues.  The decision in Kwong, allowing these 
fees, is not shocking, yet there is something unsettling about rational-
izing a fundamental right of possessing a firearm in one’s home with 
a doctrine based on parade registrations or protests.  In essence, the 
Kwong decision charges a fee to effectively prevent gun violence. 
But does charging a fee that would keep weapons out of the 
hands of financially underprivileged citizens truly promote the gov-
ernment’s agenda that warrants the fundamental burden?  Does this 
lead to the conclusion that those with enough wealth to acquire a 
home and a firearm license are in the best position to promote the 
public safety concern that warrant the licensing fee in the first place?  
Further, does this program truly cost this much?  If answered affirma-
tively, then why is it so much higher in New York City than any-
where else in the state? 
Although the Second Circuit tailored its opinion narrowly in 
its decision of Kwong v. Bloomberg, the result has yet to put an end 
to future Second Amendment infringement claims where restraints 
further test the boundaries of a substantial burden on this fundamental 
right, especially in light of recent tragedies such as the Newtown, 





153 Kwong, 723 F.3d at 175-76 (Walker, J., concurring). 
154 See James Barron, Nation Reels After Gunman Massacres 20 Children at School in 
Connecticut, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Dec. 14, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/2012/12/15/ 
nyregion/shooting-reported-at-connecticut-elementary-school.html?pagewanted=all (“A 20-
year-old man wearing combat gear and armed with semiautomatic pistols and a semiauto-
matic rifle killed 26 people - 20 of them children.”); see also Michael D. Shear, Gunman and 
12 Victims Killed in Shooting at D.C. Navy Yard, THE NEW YORK TIMES, (Sept. 16, 2013), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2013/09/17/us/shooting-reported-at-washington-navy-yard.html?pa 
gewanted%3Dall (“A former Navy reservist killed at least 12 people . . . in a mass shooting 
at a secure military facility.”). 
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